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Stabilization Policy in an Economy with Two
Exchange Rate Regimes∗
Sven W. Arndt
Abstract
This paper uses a flex-price open economy macro model to examine the effectiveness of U.S.
monetary and fiscal policies when the dollar floats freely against the euro, but is fixed against the
Chinese yuan. It is assumed that capital mobility is high between the U.S. and the Eurozone, but
low between the U.S. and China. The model allows for short-run price flexibility and imperfect
substitutability between domestic and foreign financial assets.
The focus is on the implications for the efficacy of U.S. macro stabilization policies of China’s
fixed-rate strategy. While many countries have pegged their currencies to the dollar, China is large
enough to have an impact. It is shown that its large size enables China to impede the effectiveness
of U.S. macroeconomic policies. Indeed, while the U.S. is officially tagged as an independent
floater, Chinese intervention is capable of interfering with dollar-euro flexibility and thereby cre-
ates outcomes that are more consistent with policy under fixed rates.
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1. Introduction 
 
A widely used approach in modeling the role of the exchange rate in open-
economy macroeconomics is to assume that a country is either a pegger against 
the rest of the world or a floater. In that spirit, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) classifies the United States as an “independent floater.” While this is an 
appropriate interpretation of (de jure) U.S. policy, it does not accurately reflect 
the country’s de facto exchange-rate regime. That regime is a combination of 
floating rates against most countries and a fixed rate against the renminbi (RMB) 
or yuan, fixed by intervention of the Chinese monetary authority. 
The object of this paper is to explore the implications of such a mixed 
exchange-rate regime for (i) the effectiveness of domestic macro stabilization 
policies and (ii) the transmission of foreign shocks and disturbances. The analysis 
is carried out with the aid of a medium-term open-economy macro model with 
prices and output both flexible (implying a positively sloped aggregate supply 
curve) and with capital mobility high between the U.S. and the Eurozone and low 
between the U.S. and China. 1  A final section examines the implications of 
production sharing between the U.S. and China for adjustment at the macro level. 
It is shown that China’s exchange rate policy has material implications for U.S. 
macro policy autonomy and for the effect of foreign shocks on the U.S. economy. 
A particularly important consequence is that Chinese intervention, and the manner 
in which dollars are recycled into circulation in the U.S., interferes with the 
“automatic” adjustment mechanism in the American economy.      
Section 2 provides an outline of the model and derives solutions for the 
benchmark scenario of a freely floating dollar against both currencies. Section 3 
works out the mixed-regime scenario and provides an assessment of the U.S.-
China policy debate over the causes of the bilateral current account imbalance. 
Section 4 focuses on the international transmission of economic shocks and 
disturbances in a mixed-rate regime and shows that fixing causes the U.S. 
economy to become more exposed to cyclical disturbances in China.. Section 5 
examines the implications of production fragmentation between the U.S. and 
China and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Freely Floating Rates Everywhere 
 
In this section, the dollar is assumed to float freely against both the euro and the 
yuan. This is the preferred regime, according to Washington policy makers who 
continue to press China to allow the yuan to float against the dollar. The results of 
                                                 
1 For an analysis of some of these issues in a sticky-price model, see Arndt (2011). 
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this section will thus serve as a benchmark against which to evaluate the 
outcomes associated with the actual mixed-rate regime. 
The model in this paper is one that is familiar to and used by most policy 
makers. It is based on the Mundell-Fleming (MF) model, but allows for price 
flexibility. Hence, rather than being flat, the aggregate supply curve is positively 
sloped. The broad effect of this change in structure is to reduce the response of 
income and employment to policy initiatives, because some portion of the energy 
of policy stimuli is absorbed into price changes. It also introduces an additional 
source of changes in real exchange rates. 
The basic structure of the model is given by the well-known equilibrium 
conditions for the money market, the goods market and the balance of payments. 
The money market is specified as follows: 
 
H/P = L(y, i), (1) 
 
where H represents the monetary base, P is a general price index, y is real gross 
domestic product, and i is a nominal interest rate or structure of nominal interest 
rates. The real demand for money, L, responds positively to income or output and 
negatively to the rate of interest. 
 Goods market equilibrium is specified as follows:  
 
I(i) + T(y, y*, y^; e*, e^) – S(y) = -G,    (2) 
 
where I is real capital formation, T is the trade balance or current account, S is 
private-sector saving, G represents the government budget deficit, y* and y^ stand 
for Eurozone and Chinese GDP, respectively, and e* and e^ represent the dollar’s 
real exchange rate with respect to the euro and the yuan, respectively. The real 
exchange rate is defined as the nominal rate E (expressed as the dollar price of the 
respective foreign currency) multiplied by the ratio of the respective foreign price 
level to the U.S price variable, P. Investment responds negatively to the rate of 
interest; the current account worsens with a rise in U.S. income, but improves 
with foreign GDP and improves with a rise in either real exchange rate. Private 
sector saving is positively related to domestic GDP. 
There are two balance-of-payments equilibrium conditions, one for the 
Eurozone, the other for China. 
 
T*(y, y*, e*) + K*(i, i*) = 0, (3a) 
 
and 
 
T^(y, y^, e^) + K^(i, i^) = 0,  (3b) 
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where capital inflows respond positively to the domestic interest rate and 
negatively to the respective foreign rates. As noted above, capital mobility with 
Europe is assumed to be high, while that with China is low. 
 The aggregate supply curve is modeled as follows: 
 
P = P(y), Py > 0.  (4) 
 
Monetary Expansion 
 
The effects of a monetary expansion in the United States are summarized in 
Figure 1. The curves are familiar from the standard open-economy macro model, 
except that all slopes will generally be steeper as a result of the assumption of 
price flexibility. The steeper of the two balance-of-payments curves, B^B^ 
reflects the low degree of capital mobility vis-à-vis China. A monetary expansion 
shifts out the LL curve. The rise in domestic GDP and decline in the domestic rate 
of interest worsen both current accounts and both financial accounts. There is 
unambiguous pressure on the dollar to depreciate against both currencies. These 
depreciations shift the goods-market equilibrium and the two balance-of-
payments functions to the right. 
 
 
Figure 1 
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At the new equilibrium, B, domestic income has risen, but by less than in 
the standard model, because the domestic price level has also increased. The 
magnitude of this price-adjustment effect depends on the slope (Py) of the 
aggregate supply curve. The rise in U.S. prices implies that the dollar’s real 
depreciation is smaller than the nominal depreciation with respect to both 
currencies. If purchasing power held before the shock, it no longer does in the 
new equilibrium.  The relative magnitudes of the real depreciations depend on the 
values of both trade and financial account parameters. 
  
Fiscal Expansion 
 
The effects of an expansionary fiscal policy (dG>0) are summarized in Figure 2. 
The rise in government expenditures shifts out the goods market equilibrium 
function. The consequent rise in domestic GDP worsens both current accounts, 
while the rise in the domestic interest rate improves the financial account with the 
Eurozone by more than enough to offset the current account deterioration, but by 
less than is needed to offset the deterioration of the current account with China. 
There is thus pressure for the dollar to appreciate against the euro and to 
depreciate against the yuan. This has the effect of shifting the B*B* curve to the 
left and the B^B^ curve to the right. In the new equilibrium, they will have to 
intersect somewhere on the stationary LL curve. The exact location of that 
intersection depends on adjustment in the goods market.  
The goods-market line is subject to two opposing pressures, with the euro 
depreciation tending to push it to the left and the yuan appreciation tending to 
push it to the right. The actual direction of movement depends on the relative 
strengths of these two effects. If they are equal, there will be no further movement 
of the GG curve and the final equilibrium will, as shown, lie at the point of 
intersection of the G1G1 and LL curves.  
In that event, the policy’s effectiveness will not differ from that of the 
closed-economy case. If dollar-euro adjustment is the dominant force, then the 
G1G1-line shifts left and policy effectiveness is weakened. If dollar-yuan 
adjustment dominates, then the line shifts to the right and policy effectiveness is 
strengthened.   
Hence, ironically, low capital mobility between the U.S. and China, which 
is to a significant extent the result of capital and exchange controls in the latter, 
serves to strengthen the effectiveness of U.S. fiscal policy. 
The dollar’s real appreciation against the euro is reinforced by the rise in 
the domestic price level. The dollar’s real depreciation against the yuan is made 
smaller than its nominal depreciation by the rise in the U.S. price level. 
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Figure 2 
 
3. The Euro Floats While the Yuan is Fixed 
 
In this section, it is assumed that China intervenes in the foreign exchange market 
in order to prevent the yuan’s value from changing against the dollar. When the 
Chinese central bank intervenes to prevent the yuan from appreciating, it pulls 
dollars out of circulation, which has the same effect on U.S. money supply as 
would an intervention by the Federal Reserve. When the Chinese central bank 
uses these dollars to purchase U.S. Treasury securities in the open market, the 
effect is to offset the reduction in U.S. money supply brought about by the 
intervention itself. The result is well-known in the literature on sterilized 
exchange-market intervention: U.S. money supply is unchanged, the automatic 
adjustment mechanism for fixed-rate regimes is frozen, and the imbalance in the 
China-U.S. bilateral balance of payments is made “permanent”. 
The shift in the Chinese exchange-rate regime from floating to fixed 
requires a change in our specification of money market equilibrium. As in the 
previous case, base money is adjusted by the Fed through changes in domestic 
credit via standard open-market operations. When China intervenes to absorb an 
excess supply of dollars in the foreign exchange market, the result is to reduce 
base money in the U.S., very much like a Fed intervention (of selling yuan for 
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dollars) would reduce base money. When the central bank of China follows up by 
purchasing U.S. Treasuries, the foregoing reduction in base money is offset.2  
 
Monetary Expansion 
 
The effects of a monetary expansion in the context of this mixed regime are 
summarized in Figure 3. The initial effect is to shift the LL curve to the right, 
which tends to reduce interest rates and raise domestic output and prices. With 
respect to the euro, both the current account and the financial account with the 
Eurozone deteriorate, thereby generating pressures for the dollar to depreciate 
against the euro. This tends to push both the GG curve and the B*B* curve to the 
right. 
The rise in income and decline in domestic interest rates tend also to 
worsen both sides of the U.S. balance of payments with China. In order to prevent 
the yuan from appreciating against the dollar, the Chinese authorities intervene in 
the foreign exchange market in order to absorb the excess supply of dollars, after 
which they convert these dollars into U.S. Treasury securities. In combination, 
these two actions maintain the U.S. money supply at its new level. 
 
 
Figure 3 
                                                 
2  For an intermediate scenario in which the Chinese authorities purchase Treasury securities 
directly from the Fed, see Arndt (2011). In that scenario, the automatic adjustment mechanism 
continues to function. 
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We rewrite the equilibrium condition for the U.S.-China balance of 
payments in order to reflect the fact that any imbalance in autonomous 
transactions will always be met by an offsetting transaction on official reserve 
account: 
 
T^(y, y^, e^) + K^(i, i^) + R^ = 0, (3c) 
 
where R^ represents the level of dollar reserves held by the Chinese authorities 
and where dE^ = 0. While the nominal exchange rate is fixed, the flexibility of 
U.S. prices in this model makes room for changes in the real rate of exchange 
between the two countries. 
 Returning to Figure 3, we note that the new LL curve is now the anchor 
for the system in the sense that the new equilibrium must lie somewhere on that 
function. Suppose that the new goods-market and U.S.-Europe balance-of-
payments curves meet at point B on the new LL curve. The combination of 
interest rate and income represented by that point leaves the autonomous U.S.-
China balance of payments in deficit, i.e., the sum of the first two terms in 
equation (3c) is negative. This requires the Chinese central bank to accumulate 
dollars in perpetuity or until the U.S. central bank reverses its easy-money 
policy.3  The B^B^ curve through point B thus reflects a balance of payments 
equilibrium in which a U.S. deficit in autonomous transactions is just covered by 
Chinese reserve accumulation. 
 At point B the dollar has depreciated against the euro in both nominal and 
real terms. It has remained unchanged against the yuan in nominal terms, but has 
appreciated against the Chinese currency in real terms. This appreciation is the 
result of the increase in the U.S. price level. 
 
Fiscal Expansion 
 
The effects of a U.S. fiscal expansion are summarized in Figure 4. The policy 
stimulus moves the GG curve to the right, tending to raise income and the rate of 
interest. As in the previous section, the rise in income causes both current account 
balances to deteriorate, while the higher interest rate attracts capital inflows from 
both countries. In the case of the Eurozone, where capital mobility is high, the 
improvement in the bilateral financial account exceeds the deterioration in the 
current account, thereby putting pressure on the dollar to appreciate against the 
euro. This appreciation causes the GG and B*B* curves to shift left. This is the 
familiar finding that high capital mobility reduces the effectiveness of fiscal 
policy. 
                                                 
3 A later section considers some of the implications for the ongoing debate between the U.S. and 
China on who is responsible for and what should be done about the sustained current imbalances. 
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 On the Chinese side, low capital mobility limits the improvement of the 
financial account, so that the balance on autonomous payments deteriorates. 
Under floating rates, the dollar would depreciate against the yuan, thereby tending 
to strengthen the effectiveness of the fiscal expansion. The central bank of China 
prevents the yuan from appreciating by soaking up the excess supply of dollars 
and converting them into Treasury securities. The new B^B^ curve through point 
B represents a balance-of-payments equilibrium in which the deficit in 
autonomous transactions is just offset by reserve accumulation on the part of the 
Chinese authorities. 
At point B, the dollar has appreciated against the euro in both nominal and 
real terms; it has remained fixed in nominal terms against the yuan, but has 
appreciated in real terms against the Chinese currency. This additional boost to 
the real value of the dollar worsens the imbalance between the U.S. and China, 
but it is important to keep in mind that this model does not take into account 
possible price increases in China.  
 
 
Figure 4 
 
Lessons for the China-U.S. Policy Debate 
 
The persistent China-U.S. current account imbalances continue to be a significant 
irritant in relations between the two countries. Many U.S. commentators and 
politicians tend to blame China’s policy of fixing the yuan to the dollar at levels 
that may be too low. High and steadily rising levels of China’s foreign-exchange 
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reserves are cited as the primary piece of evidence that the yuan is undervalued. 
China’s response has been to use the national income identity to argue that the 
problem is “made in the U.S.A.” and arises from imbalances in the country’s 
public finances and private sector saving and investment. 
 Although the model used in this paper is not fully suited to resolving the 
debate, it does offer some useful insights. First, the discussion in Section 2 shows 
that a flexible yuan would indeed restore balance in autonomous transactions. It 
does not say that there could not exist continuous current account imbalances, 
financed by financial account imbalances of equal magnitude and opposite sign. 
The cases captured by Figs. 1 and 3 taken together suggest that a shift by China 
from fixed to floating rates would cause the yuan to appreciate against the dollar, 
would reduce the bilateral current account imbalance, and would boost output and 
employment in the United States. 
 The discussion in earlier sections has underscored the role of low capital 
mobility between the U.S. and China in driving the results. Thus, another way in 
which China could alleviate the imbalance problem is to eliminate or reduce 
controls on capital movements, thereby allowing Chinese households, firms, and 
organizations to expand their portfolios toward foreign-currency-denominated 
assets. Paired with a fixed exchange rate, this policy would spread accumulation 
of foreign assets away from the central bank to the rest of the Chinese economy. 
Among the many benefits would be asset diversification and better returns. It 
would sharply reduce the gap between the current value of the yuan and its 
equilibrium or market-clearing value on the assumption that there is within China 
a pent-up private demand for dollar and other foreign assets. This reduction in the 
misalignment of the bilateral exchange rate would not only cool the rhetoric in 
Washington, but reduce the threat to small and medium-sized firms in China’s 
leading export sectors of a move to greater exchange-rate flexibility. 
 As for the “made-in-America” argument, deficit reduction in the U.S. 
would have results opposite to those discussed in connection with Figure 4: it 
would reduce the bilateral imbalance. A rise in private sector saving, which has 
occurred in the aftermath of the financial crisis, would also have that effect. The 
downside of this strategy is that its short-run effect would be to reduce output and 
employment and thus to aggravate the economic situation in the U.S.   
 Finally, when the Chinese central bank recycles intervention dollars by 
purchasing U.S. government securities from the public or directly from the 
Treasury, it essentially neutralizes the forces that would work to restore balance in 
the foreign exchange market. The Fed might want to implement a strategy of 
selling Treasury securities directly to the Chinese authorities and thereby make 
room for the contraction of money supply that would follow. 
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4. Cross-Border Transmission  
 
Most economies have become significantly more open in recent years, with more 
extensive linkages among domestic and foreign markets for goods, services, and 
assets. One of the consequences may be that shocks and disturbances are more 
easily transmitted from one country to another, allowing for the usual caveats 
pertaining to transaction, transportation, and communication costs. In goods and 
services trade, an important contributor to this development has been the growth 
of cross-border production networks, which means that a downturn in demand in 
a country like the United States spreads to other countries not only via traditional 
“horizontal” channels, but by “vertical” channels along the value-added chain. 
In the financial arena, greater market integration means that risky or 
contaminated assets held by financial institution in one country, create problems 
not only for the immediate parties involved, but for lenders and investors in third 
countries, who have provided funding to the process.4  These often complex and 
opaque linkages are at least partly to blame for the growing role of contagion 
effects.    
 The nature and extent of cross-border transmission of shocks and 
disturbances depends on the exchange rate regime. In the model of this paper, 
flexible exchange rates provide significant insulation. In the first scenario, when 
the dollar floats against both currencies, a change in income growth in either 
China or the Eurozone has no effect on U.S. GDP or interest rates. Its only effect 
is to cause the expanding country’s currency to appreciate against the dollar. This 
appreciation exactly offsets the stimulus emitted by the growth increase. 
 When the Chinese exchange rate is fixed along the lines of the second 
scenario, however, there is transmission. As shown in Figure 5, a rise in Chinese 
GDP initially shifts goods-market equilibrium and the U.S.-China autonomous 
payments curve to the right. Under high capital mobility, the dollar appreciates 
against the euro, which moves the new G and B* curves to the left. The B^ curve 
running through point B represents overall payments equilibrium between the 
U.S. and China (while the B1^ curve represents equilibrium in autonomous 
transactions only). Hence, the distance between those curves represents the 
period-by-period decline in Chinese foreign-exchange reserves. Thus, a rise in 
Chinese growth raises U.S. GDP. In this model, at least, the rapid Chinese growth 
in recent years would not have had the beneficial effects on U.S. economic 
activity if there had been a floating rate between the two currencies. 
                                                 
4 This recalls a feature of the European sovereign debt crisis, where suspect Greek government 
bonds undermine confidence not only in German and other European banks who made the initial 
loans, but in the U.S.-based money-market funds who provided some of the funding. 
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Finally, again in the second scenario of a mixed exchange-rate regime, 
faster growth in the Eurozone has no effect on the U.S. economy. Its only 
consequence is to cause the dollar to appreciate against the euro.     
 
 
Figure 5 
 
5. Production Sharing and Vertical Intra-Industry Trade 
 
Cross-border production networks and vertical intra-industry investment and trade 
have grown rapidly in recent years, helped along by increasingly open and 
interlinked economies and important cost-saving innovations in transportation and 
communication technologies. As a result, trade in intermediates, parts and 
components has seen significant growth relative to other forms of trade. Indeed, 
the share of such transactions in total trade has become large enough to affect 
adjustment at the macro level. As Arndt & Huemer (2007) and others have 
shown, vertical intra-industry trade reduces the sensitivity of the trade balance and 
current account to movements in exchange rates. Arndt (2010) has argued that the 
growth of direct links between a country’s exports and imports, which are typical 
of vertical intra-industry trade, alter response functions and adjustment patterns in 
a standard open-economy macro model of the Mundell-Fleming type. 
An additional feature of vertical intra-industry trade is that it exposes non-
traded goods and services directly to variations in exchange rates and to 
competition from abroad. This follows from the fact that production of non-traded 
goods may contain tradable components and non-traded services may contain 
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tradable constituent activities. For example, X-ray procedures may not be 
tradable, but reading and analyzing X-ray images are tradable activities. Hence, 
the total cost of an X-ray procedure will rise with depreciation of a country’s 
currency if image analysis is outsourced to a foreign operator. 
 It is possible to explore the implications of such developments in the 
context of the present model by rewriting equation (4) to include an exchange-rate 
effect. We assume that the share of components trade between the U.S. and China 
is large enough to imply that a dollar depreciation against the yuan shifts the 
aggregate supply curve up and we model that effect as follows: 
 
P = P(y, E^). (4a) 
 
 The main consequence is to introduce a direct effect of exchange-rate 
changes into the money demand function, so that variations in the dollar-yuan 
exchange rate move the LL curve under floating rates. As suggested earlier, 
another effect is to reduce the responsiveness of the GG and B^B^ curves to 
variations in exchange rates. This makes exchange-rate variability a less forceful 
instrument for payments adjustment. 
  
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
Over the decades, many countries have unilaterally fixed their currencies to the 
U.S. dollar. Countries in Latin America and in East Asia have been among them. 
Since they have tended to be small relative to the huge U.S. economy, their 
pegging policies have not aroused much concern in the United States. By and 
large, they have not seemed to interfere with U.S. policy-making autonomy. 
 The People’s Republic of China also unilaterally pegs the yuan to the 
dollar, but its economy is large. As the ongoing debate over the implications of 
this policy suggests, it has become a major irritant to the U.S. From the point of 
view of many American businesses, the “undervalued” level at which the yuan is 
fixed gives China an unfair competitive edge in trade relations between the two 
countries. The policy also contributes to the large bilateral current account 
imbalance and to rising U.S. indebtedness to China. 
 A third issue, which has received less attention, concerns the extent to 
which unilateral pegging by China interferes with U.S. macroeconomic policy 
autonomy. This question is examined in the preceding pages with the aid of a 
medium-term open-economy macro model in which both prices and output are 
flexible. The focus is on the effectiveness of U.S. monetary and fiscal policies and 
the transmission of foreign disturbances to U.S. economic activity. A key 
assumption throughout is that capital mobility is high between the U.S. and the 
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Eurozone and other countries against which the dollar floats, but low between the 
U.S. and China. 
 The model is first solved for the system preferred by the U.S., namely, 
universal flexible exchange rates. This is the benchmark result against which the 
de facto alternative of a mixed-rate regime is compared. It is shown that China’s 
pegging policy does affect the efficacy of U.S. macro policies, in part because 
China uses the dollar as its main reserve currency. By recycling intervention 
dollars into U.S. Treasury securities, China contributes to the “permanent” nature 
of the bilateral current account imbalance.  
 It is also shown that growth spurts from China to the U.S. have positive 
effects in the U.S. compared to growth spurts from the Eurozone. In the context of 
the recent recession in the U.S., that may actually have been a desirable result of 
China’s policy. 
 An important element in U.S.-China trade relations is the importance of 
production networking and processing trade. These features are shown to affect 
the nature and efficiency of trade-balance adjustment in ways that do not exist in 
U.S. trade with the other countries in the model.   
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